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A pay-as-you-go pension scheme is associated with positive externalities of having children 
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scheme displays both a benefit contingent on the contributions of children and a purely 
fertility-related component. 
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Investing in the quantity and quality of children is associated with positive
ﬁscal externalities when a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension scheme is in place.
In such a system, the contributions paid by workers are immediately spent
on current pensioners. With given social security contribution rates, total
contributions rise both with a higher number and a higher productivity of
contributors. Hence, when individuals decide to have children or to pro-
vide them with human capital, utility levels of other individuals in the same
generation will rise through higher expected pension claims. Consequently,
people tend to invest too little in the number and quality of their children.
This problem counteracts the function of a PAYG pension scheme as an en-
forcement device to ensure suﬃciently high transfers from children to their
parents (Sinn, 2004).
Our paper addresses the question of how the pension formula has to be
adapted in order to incorporate the externalities in some sense of optimality.
While other policy instruments such as family allowances or scholarships for
talented students may serve the same purpose, it is interesting to ﬁnd out the
consequences if the internalization takes place only in the pension scheme.
The analysis allows conclusions with respect to the use of alternative policy
instruments, as equivalent instrument sets can be constructed. In our study,
the goal is to maximize the sum of utilities in the parent generation given
a ﬁxed social security contribution rate on wages. We consider an economy
with heterogeneity in productivity where the outcomes of investment in both
fertility and education are stochastic.
In addition to the externality problem, it has been noted that the ex-
tension of public pensions drives down fertility. Public pensions crowd out
transfer schemes within families. If individuals do not care about the well-
being of their oﬀspring, the smaller transfers old parents receive from their
children reduce the demand for children (Cigno, 1993). The same prediction
turns out if parents are altruistic toward their children provided that the
economy is in a dynamically eﬃcient situation, that is, when the rate of re-
1turn in a PAYG scheme falls short of the interest rate. While parents would
like to compensate their children for the social security transfer, the implicit
tax on contributions raises the price of a child, reducing the demand for chil-
dren (Becker and Barro, 1988). Empirical evidence for the negative impact
of social security on fertility is presented in Cigno and Rosati (1996), Cigno
et al. (2003), and Boldrin et al. (2005). Although a similar argument can be
given when considering education, it is not considered as empirically relevant.
The asymmetry is a consequence of diﬀerences in policy interventions. Many
countries have already adopted some type of child beneﬁt in the pension
formula, but the size of these beneﬁts is much smaller everywhere than the
contributions of the child to the pension system. At the same time, schooling
is subsidized at a rate of almost one hundred per cent. In our analysis we
ignore observable education and focus on human capital acquisition within
the family. As lots of studies stress the importance of the family background
when explaining educational outcomes (for example, Woessmann, 2004), set-
ting incentives for unobservable education eﬀort at home seems to be quite
appropriate.
In order to keep the analysis simple, we investigate a framework of a small
open economy with a stationary technology. We ignore impacts of changing
parameters of the PAYG pension system on growth via savings, which have
been discussed in endogenous growth settings by Zhang (1995) and Wigger
(1999). Both fertility and the individual’s productivity is stochastic where
in each case the level of investment aﬀects the probability distribution of
outcomes. As a result, we have both high and low productive households,
with and without children. Mirroring a stylized fact, we assume that the
direct cost of providing a child with a given level of education is lower for
high productivity parents. The heterogeneity of individuals enables us to
study the impacts of ﬁnancial incentives on diﬀerent groups. It is not obvi-
ous how an ‘optimum’ mix of encouraging fertility and education should look
like. Individuals ﬁrst choose the level of their fertility investment. After the
number of children is known, people decide on savings and human capital
2investment. Some intrinsic motivation for having children and a preference
for letting them arrive at a high productivity will yield positive investment in
the quantity and quality of human capital even in the absence of ﬁnancial in-
centives. The pension consists of up to four components: a share contingent
on previous earnings, a beneﬁt that depends on the number of children, a
component that assigns parts of the children’s contributions to their parents,
and a ﬂat beneﬁt. Individuals exhibit quasi-linear preferences. The obvious
drawback of this speciﬁcation is the exclusive impact of income changes on
working age consumption. This problem may be outweighed by the advan-
tage that utilities can simply be added in the welfare analysis, where results
are not driven by distributional aspects within a generation.
With this speciﬁcation, increasing fertility-related pensions will lead to
a larger number of children while not aﬀecting the educational eﬀort levels
of parents. In contrast, a higher share of children’s contributions directly
transferred to their parents will yield both more human capital investment
and a higher number of children. The latter result is a consequence of the
fact that children become more proﬁtable for their parents.
In any ﬁrst-best allocation, investment in fertility and education will be
increased to the level where the marginal cost is equal to the aggregate mar-
ginal beneﬁt arising for the parent generation. At the same time, old age
consumption is perfectly smoothed across all states. The former optimality
condition requires incentives for investment in education. However, using
such incentives implies that consumption smoothing will not be achieved
when the outcome of the investment decision is uncertain. The second-best
scheme therefore displays the property that parents collect some of their chil-
dren’s contributions, but not the full amounts. As some underinvestment in
fertility would otherwise occur, the optimum scheme is also associated with
some fertility-related component.
The standard message of the literature on PAYG pensions and endoge-
nous is that an internalization of the positive externality requires that the full
PAYG pension is made contingent on fertility (Kolmar, 1997). This result
3carries over to several alternative speciﬁcations, as allowing for migration
(Kolmar, 2001) or decision-making by couples (Abio et al., 2004). As an
alternative, family allowances can be introduced being equal to the present
value of a child’s contribution (van Groezen et al., 2003; van Groezen and
Meijdam, 2004). This amount represents the net social gain of an additional
individual given that her pension will be ﬁnanced by her children (Sinn,
2001).
In some recent papers, several arguments have been given, under which
circumstances the standard proposition will fail. First, a stronger fertility in-
centive can reduce lifetime labor supply, imposing a negative externality on
the older generation through declining pensions (Fenge and Meier, 2004 and
2005). Second, if the outcome of the fertility decision is stochastic, the opti-
mum scheme sets milder fertility incentives in order to decrease the income
risk (Cremer et al., 2004a). Third, if individuals exhibit cost diﬀerences in
raising children, a utilitarian government will choose to redistribute towards
high cost individuals, which again calls for less fertility-related pensions (Cre-
mer et al., 2004b).
Few attempts have been undertaken to study the interactions of fertility,
investment in human capital, and PAYG pensions. Peters (1995) analyzes
a closed economy framework in which the government can subsidize private
education. He ﬁnds a quantity-quality tradeoﬀ, and argues that education
will always be subsidized while fertility may be taxed. The contributions
closest in spirit to our analysis are Cigno et al. (2003) and Cigno and Lu-
porini (2003). The former discusses a framework in which parents can de-
terministically choose the number of children and an action that aﬀects the
child’s tax-paying capacity in a stochastic fashion. While the government can
force the individuals to choose the optimum number of children, transfers to
parents are made contingent on the child’s performance, for example by a
scholarship. As in our paper, Cigno and Luporini (2003) introduce stochastic
fertility and cost diﬀerences across parents in providing their children with
human capital. The optimum tax-transfer scheme is associated with pay-
4ments contingent on the child’s performance and a purely fertility-related
component to insure parents against an unfortunate outcome of their human
capital investment decision. These features appear again in our framework
in which we apply quite a similar structure to the speciﬁc problem arising in
the PAYG pension scheme. We depart from the analysis of Cigno and Lu-
porini in two respects. First, we add heterogeneity in income in the parent
generation that determines the private cost of educating children, which is
therefore observable for the government. Second, we eliminate the govern-
ment’s motive for income redistribution by imposing quasi-linear preferences.
Therefore, the results reﬂect only eﬃciency issues.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the model. The comparative static analysis in Section 3 discusses the im-
pacts on changing parameters in the pension formula on saving, fertility and
human capital investment. Section 4 deals with the structure of ﬁrst-best
allocations and shows that welfare losses will necessarily arise in our imper-
fect information framework. In the following Section 5, second-best pension
schemes are characterized. The ﬁnal Section 6 discusses the main ﬁndings.
2 The model
We consider a small open economy where the rate of interest and the wage
rate for one eﬃciency unit of labor is determined at the world market. In
order to analyze fertility choices, we employ a three-period overlapping gen-
erations model. For simplicity, we consider a one-sex population consisting of
females. A generation lives for three periods. In the ﬁrst period an individual
lives with her parent. She receives an education level e which is chosen by
her mother.
In the second period, the productivity of the individual is revealed, being
either high, θh,o rl o w ,θl, with θl <θ h. An individual of type i ∈{ h,l}
supplies one unit of labor and receives a gross wage income θi. The wage
rate for one eﬃciency unit of labor is normalized to one. Furthermore, the
5household of type i chooses the investment mi that aﬀects the expected
number of children she will have in this period.1 In contrast to Cigno and
Luporini (2003), the activity is associated with an expenditure which serves
to avoid corner solutions in the absence of a PAYG scheme. The outcome of
the fertility investment, represented by the number of children, is stochastic.
With probability pi = p(mi) the realized number of children will be n, with
n>0. In the opposite event, occurring with probability 1 − pi, the number
of children will be zero. The fertility investment increases the probability of
having children, i.e. p 
i > 0, but at a decreasing rate, p  
i < 0. Raising one
child is associated with a cost K.
Knowing the realized number of children j with j ∈{ 0,n}, a household of
type i decides how much to save, sij, and to consume, cij, and, provided that
there are children, how much to invest in the education of each child, ρ(θi)ei,
with ei ≥ 0. The cost of providing children with a given level of education
varies according to the productivity of the mother, with ρ  < 0. The cost
advantage of high productivity parents reﬂects either possible genetic factors
or the home environment, as factors in human capital production explaining
the observable intergenerational correlation of abilities. The outcome of the
investment depends on the input in a stochastic fashion. With probability
qi = q(ei), all siblings will have high productivity θh. Otherwise, with prob-
ability 1 − qi, all siblings end up with productivity θl. The assumption of
perfect correlation across siblings is just taken for simplicity. To ensure inte-
rior solutions, the human capital production function exhibits the properties
q 
i > 0, q  
i < 0, lime→0q 
i = ∞, lime→∞ q 
i =0 . Finally, an adult has to pay
contributions to the PAYG pension system in her working period, where the
contribution rate is τ. Hence, consumption in the second period is given by
ci0 =( 1 −τ)θi − si0 − mi, (1)
cin =( 1 −τ)θi − sin − mi − n(K + ρ(θi)ei),
without and with children, respectively.
1In order to simplify notation, a superscript to indicate the period under consideration
is omitted throughout the paper wherever possible.
6In the third period a mother of type i with n children of type k retires
and consumes zk
in. Old age consumption equals the sum of private savings




in = Rsin + π
k
in. (2)
A childless retiree receives a pension πi0 and consumes zi0 = Rsi0 + πi0.
Since our focus is not on intra-generational redistribution, but on the re-
lationship between, on the one hand, the PAYG system and, on the other
hand, fertility and education, we assume quasi-linear preferences. As a con-
sequence, the aim to redistribute between rich and poor does not bias the
results. A childless parent and a mother of type i with n children of type k
achieve utility
Ui0 = ci0 + v(zi0), (3)
U
k
in = cin + v(z
k
in)+ψ(θk),
respectively, where v  > 0 and v   < 0. The function ψ measures how the
existence of children and the productivity of children directly increase the
utility of their mother, where 0 <ψ (θl) <ψ (θh). Denoting expected utility
after the number of children is revealed by













expected lifetime utility is simply
EUi = p(mi)EUi|n +( 1− p(mi))Ui0, (5)
where utility in the ﬁrst period, when no decision is taken, is omitted.
The state-run PAYG pension system relates pensions to previous own
contributions, number of children, contributions of children, and a ﬂat com-
ponent according to the formulas
πi0 = αθi + δ, (6)
π
k
in = αθi + βn+ γnθk + δ.
7The pension parameters are restricted by α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0, 0 ≤ γ ≤ τ.I fγ were
larger than τ, total beneﬁts based on own childrens’ contributions would ex-
ceed total contributions to a PAYG scheme. Neglecting the budget restriction
of the PAYG scheme, all parameters aﬀect pensions non-negatively.
Each adult solves a two-stage decision problem. First, she maximizes
lifetime utility through a decision on fertility investment. Second, after rev-
elation of the number of children, she chooses education eﬀort and savings
so as to maximize contingent expected utility, as given by (4). A solution is
determined by backward induction. Due to the properties of the probability
functions and the utility function it is natural to assume interior solutions.
Hence, lifetime income is always large enough to arrive at cij > 0 in the
household’s optimum.
According to whether or not the fertility investment has led to births, the
contingent ﬁrst-order conditions for savings are
−1+Rv












The equations state that the marginal expected rate of substitution between
old age consumption and working age consumption will be equal to the rel-
ative price 1/R. Obviously, the same consumption level in old age turns out
irrespective of previous productivity for childless individuals, zl0 = zh0. Fur-
thermore, old age consumption of individuals of a given productivity type
varies both with the number and type of children if and only if γ>0.
Choosing the educational investment per child is of course only relevant












In the optimum, the marginal cost associated with one additional unit of ed-
ucation eﬀort in the second period, nρ(θi), is equal to the expected marginal
beneﬁt. The latter arises through an increased probability of high produc-
tivity children according to q (ei). Parents prefer to have high productivity
8children for its own sake, as expressed by ψ(θh)−ψ(θl) > 0. Moreover, their
old age consumption may increase if their children’s contributions have a di-
rect impact on their pension, where the utility gain is given by v(zh
in)−v(zl
in).
Finally, the ﬁrst-order condition for optimal fertility investment is
−1 − p
 (mi)[n[K + ρ(θi)ei]+sin − si0]+p
















Investing one additional dollar in fertility directly reduces working age con-
sumption. It increases the probability of n births according to p (mi). Having
these n children will be associated with direct costs nK, and costs of edu-
cation nρ(θi)ei. Saving then changes from si0 to sin. If the education eﬀort
turns out to be successful, which happens with probability q(ei), the house-
hold will arrive at utility from old age consumption and children as given by
v(zh
in)+ψ(θh). The respective values for parents with less productive children
and childless individuals are v(zl
in)+ψ(θl) and v(zi0).
3 Comparative Statics
Comparative static results on the impacts of changes in the ﬂat pension, the
contribution-related pension, and the fertility-related pension are summa-
rized in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 Increasing either the lump-sum pension, δ, or the contribution-
related pension, αθi, leads to a compensating fall in savings where all old
age consumption levels, zi0,zh
in,zl
in, educational investment, ei, and fertility
investment, mi, are unchanged. Increasing the fertility-related pension, βn,
does not aﬀect savings of childless individuals, si0, induces a compensating
fall in savings of individuals with children, sin, leaves educational investment
per child unchanged, and increases the fertility investment level.
Proof. See Appendix A. ￿
9Due to the speciﬁcation of the quasi-linear utility function and the as-
sumption that income suﬃces for having positive working age consumption,
all income increases are exclusively used to raise working age consumption.
A rising fertility-related pension increases the marginal beneﬁt of a child.
Hence, increasing the fertility investment level is the natural consequence.
Lemma 2 shows the consequences of varying the share of contributions
that are directly collected by the respective parents.
Lemma 2 Raising the pension contingent on the children’s contribution,
γnθk, does not aﬀect savings of childless individuals, decreases savings of
individuals with children, and raises both investment in education per child
and investment in fertility.
Proof. See Appendix B. ￿
Again, rising pensions are compensated by a reduction in savings to sat-
isfy the condition on the intertemporal distribution of consumption. As ed-
ucation becomes more proﬁtable, it is not surprising that the educational
eﬀort per child is increased. At an unchanged education eﬀort, we also have
a higher marginal beneﬁt from investment in fertility. Therefore, the fertility
investment goes up.
Last, Lemma 3 demonstrates the diﬀerences in the behavior of the two
types.
Lemma 3 More productive individuals save less both with and without chil-
dren, and invest more in fertility and education per child.
Proof. See Appendix C. ￿
More productive individuals receive a higher net income, face a lower
price of education of their children and will have a higher contribution-related
pension. Since increases in income are always used to raise working age con-
sumption, savings decrease due to both a higher contribution-related pension
and the income eﬀect associated with the smaller price of education. A lower
price of education implies that the price of a child also goes down for any
10given positive education eﬀort. Hence, it is easily understood that productive
individuals invest more in both fertility and education per child.
4 First-best allocations
First-best allocations are deﬁned as follows. A ﬁrst-best allocation maxi-
mizes welfare of the currently working age generation subject to taxing this
generation and the next generation at the exogenous rate τ. With quasi-
linear utility, marginal utility from working age consumption will be unity
across individuals. Since redistribution will not aﬀect welfare as long as the
condition for marginal utility is met, a continuum of ﬁrst-best allocations
exists.









has to hold in any social optimum, where the subscript denotes the type of the
individual and the number of children, and the superscript their productivity.
Hence, a perfect old age consumption insurance has to exist.
Socially optimal investment in education then balances the cost of edu-
cation against all beneﬁts accruing to the parent generation:
−nρ(θi)+q
 (ei)[ ψ(θh) − ψ(θl)+τn(θh − θl)/R]=0 . (12)
In the optimum, the type-speciﬁc cost of increasing education for the n chil-
dren in the family by one unit, nρ(θi), is equal to the sum of the expected
non-monetary payoﬀ for the parents, q (ei)[ ψ(θh) − ψ(θl)], and the present
value of the expected additional transfers from these children to the pub-
lic pension system, q (ei)[ τn(θh − θl)/R]. Since q is strictly concave, the
smaller price of education for more productive parents implies that these
parents have to invest more into their children’s human capital, eh >e l.







11In other words, the marginal impact of investing an additional dollar into
education of a child has to be the same for low productivity parents and high
productivity parents.
Turning to the fertility investment decision, the optimality condition is
−(1 + p





[q(ei)θh +( 1− q(ei))θl] (14)
+p
 (mi)[ q(ei)ψ(θh)+( 1− q(ei))ψ(θl)]
=0 .
Increasing the fertility investment by one unit yields additional expected costs
of raising and educating children of p (mi)n(K +ρ(θi)ei). The present value
of the expected pension contributions of the potential children increases by
p (mi)nτ [q(ei)θh +( 1− q(ei))θl]/R. In addition, the expected nonmonetary
payoﬀ to potential parents rises by p (mi)[q(ei)ψ(θh)+( 1− q(ei))ψ(θl)]].
Note that the diﬀerence between marginal social beneﬁts and marginal so-
cial costs of education for a given number of children must be higher for high
productivity parents in the social optimum. This property would already
hold if high productivity parents choose the same human capital investment
as low productivity parents. The social planner deviates from imitating the
low productivity parents in order to achieve an even higher diﬀerence be-
tween expected beneﬁts and costs. This observation implies that p  is lower
for high productivity individuals. Since p is a strictly concave function, high
productivity individuals invest more in fertility, leading to a higher expected
number of children.
The outcome that productive parents have more children on average and
invest more per child reﬂects their advantage in human capital production.
This result need not hold if opportunity costs were taken into account such
that, for example, lifetime labor supply has to be reduced with a higher
number of children irrespective of the mother’s productivity.
In a laissez-faire economy with a lump-sum pension, we have two de-
viations from the social optimum. As individuals neglect the positive ﬁscal
12externalities, they invest too little in both the quantity and the quality of hu-
man capital. If this problem is solved by assigning all contributions of a child
to her mother, we will no longer have the same level of old age consumption
irrespective of her children’s productivity.
5 Second-best pension schemes




with respect to the pension parameters α,β,γ,δ subject to the individual’s
ﬁrst-order conditions for optimum savings, education eﬀort, and fertility in-






























, for φ = α,δ,γ,β, (17)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the PAYG budget constraint. The
envelope theorem implies that all terms vanish except for the direct impacts
of parameter φ changes through the pension scheme and the repercussions
in the pension budget restriction. Raising a pension parameter increases
welfare through higher values of old age consumption. At the optimum, this
increase will be equal to the shadow value of the resulting marginal budget
deﬁcit. The revenue side of the pension budget changes due a varying number
13and quality of contributors. Expenditures change directly and through the
stochastic consequences of the behavioral responses in the parent generation.
For the contribution-related pension parameter α and the ﬂat pension δ,
the ﬁrst-order conditions boil down to λ =1 /R. The two parameters are to
some extent indeterminate because redistribution is neutral with respect to
welfare.



























With an increasing β, the positive impact on welfare through rising old
age consumption levels is perfectly oﬀset by a higher social security deﬁcit at
given fertility levels. The net impacts arise through increasing fertility. This
raises both the number of future contributors and the number of individuals
receiving pension components for parents. Condition (18) shows that at the
second-best optimum parents of at least one productivity group i will receive
aggregate excess pension beneﬁts Nip(mi)
 
q(ei)πh
in +( 1− q(ei))πl
in − πi0
 
amounting to at least the expected total contributions of their children,
Nip(mi)τn[q(ei)θh +( 1− q(ei))θl]. If this holds for both groups, childless
individuals do not receive any beneﬁt. Inserting the pension formulas into
(18) and isolating β yields
β =( τ − γ)
 
i=h,l Nip (mi)∂mi





Hence, if γ is equal to its maximum value, τ, the fertility-related pension
parameter β must be zero. If γ is smaller than τ, β will be positive. The
fertility-related pension element is a substitute for children’s contributions
being directly assigned to their parents.




















































   
=0 ,
where λ =1 /R and (8) have been used. Equation (20) can be interpreted
as follows. First, increasing the pension contingent on own children’s con-
tributions raises welfare through more old age consumption of parents, but
also implies a deﬁcit in the pension scheme. Note that perfect consumption
smoothing across all states is impossible with γ>0. As can be seen from
v (zh
in) − (1/R) < 0 if γ>0, the net eﬀect on welfare will be negative if
this instrument is used. Second, with a rising education investment, we will
have more high productivity individuals among the contributors and more
pensioners with children receiving the higher beneﬁt. Third, as fertility is
also increased, both the total number of contributors and the number of
individuals claiming parental beneﬁts will rise.




































(τ −γ)[ q(ei)θh +( 1− q(ei))θl] − β
   
=0 .
15Proposition 1 describes the two main features of second-best schemes.
Proposition 1 Any second-best linear PAYG scheme is characterized (i) by
partial assignment of children’s contributions to their parents (i.e. 0 <γ<
τ), and (ii) by a strictly positive fertility-related component (i.e. β>0).
Proof. See Appendix D. ￿
The proposition is easily understood. If parents would receive the full
contribution of their children, there is no role for a purely fertility-related
component. However, with such a perfect internalization, old age consump-
tion smoothing across diﬀerent states according to the children’s productivity
is not achieved. Utility can therefore be increased by a reduction of the pen-
sion contingent on own children’s contribution and using these resources in
a diﬀerent fashion. Furthermore, if we do not have a full assignment of
children’s contributions to their parents, it always pays to introduce purely
fertility-related pensions. This result turns out since the externality is still
present and fertility-related pensions do not increase the old age consumption
risk among parents. Last, it is not optimal to exclusively rely on fertility-
related pensions. The obvious reason is that the positive externalities of
investing in human capital is not properly addressed by such a policy.
An obvious objection against our analysis lies in the restricted set of
solutions by imposing a parametric linear structure of the pension formula.
As an alternative, πi0, πh
in and πl
in for i = h,l may be taken as control
variables, where a non-linear second-best pension system can be derived.
We omit the calculation here since the optimum non-linear scheme turns
out to be similar to the linear PAYG scheme. We obtain λ =1 /R and
Nhπh0+Nlπl0 =0 . If pensions cannot become negative, this condition means
that childless individuals will not receive any pension. Furthermore, parents
of high productivity children should receive higher pensions than parents of
low productivity children (i.e. πh
in >π l
in). Finally, they should receive less
than their children contribute (i.e. π
j
in <τθ jn) provided that πh0 = πl0 =0 .
166C o n c l u s i o n
Incorporating the ﬁscal externalities of investing in the quantity and quality
of human capital arising through the pension scheme requires encouraging
both fertility and education. We have restricted our attention to modiﬁ-
cations of the pension formula. In a deterministic environment, a perfect
internalization would be achieved by assigning all contributions of a child to
her parent. Such a policy may still be associated with underinvestment in
education if parents do not take the beneﬁts accruing to their children fully
into account. Our analysis has ignored these relations between parents and
their children and focuses on the impacts of uncertain investment outcomes
instead. Due to the uncertainty of the investment into education, the opti-
mum scheme requires that parents receive less than the total contributions of
their children. Insurance against having less productive children is provided
by a purely fertility-related component in the pension formula.
If alternative instruments are used, the purely fertility-related component
of the incentive payment will typically be a family allowance, where the
amount is not contingent on parental income. Replacing the contributions
paid by children requires payments that depend on revealed ability of the
child. An example of such a beneﬁt is a scholarship being paid for advanced
students. Since parents of high productivity will invest more per child, they
will on average receive more of these beneﬁts.
The obvious drawback of our analysis is that there is no rationale for
providing insurance against having no children. This problem does not arise
here, as the quasi-linear utility function ensures that expected marginal util-
ity of consumption will not be aﬀected by the number of children. In a more
general framework, the consequences of designing such an element of insur-
ance will probably be ambiguous. Even comparing child care costs to the
expected present value of excess pension beneﬁts for parents does not indi-
cate the direction of income redistribution across states when the existence
of children aﬀects the marginal utility of consumption. The clear tendency
however is that higher child care costs call for even stronger subsidization
17of families. On the other hand, a more generous pension scheme associated
with high beneﬁts for families may require some compensation for those who
remain childless.
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R2v  (zi0)0 0 0
0 a22 a23 0
0 a32 a33 0


































where (7)-(10) are already taken into account.
Ignoring the boundary case that only necessary conditions hold, the de-







[a22a33 − a23a32] > 0, (25)
which requires a22a33 −a23a32 > 0.



















































































B: Proof of Lemma 2









Rθl +( θh −θl)Rnq(ei)v  (zh
in)
a32 n
Rθl +( θh − θl)nq (ei)v (zh
in)
p (mi)n

























Rθl +( θh − θl)p (mi)nq(ei)v (zh
in)
p  (mi)/p (mi)
> 0, (31)

















































































C :P r o o fo fL e m m a3




































p  (m)/p (m)
> 0, (36)


















 (θ) < 0. (38)
￿
D :P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Note that γ = τ will be associated with β =0according to (18). In this
event, it follows that ∂L
∂γ < 0, since v (zh
in) − (1/R) < 0. Hence, γ<τmust
hold for the optimum scheme.
With γ<τ , the inequality ∂L
∂β > 0 holds at β =0 . Therefore, the
optimum scheme requires β>0.
Consider now the boundary γ =0 , where β is chosen so as to satisfy (18).
Then we have v (zh
in) − (1/R)=0and, according to the Lemmas 1 and 2,
∂mi
∂γ =[ θl +[ θh − θl]q(ei)] ∂mi



























at γ =0 . Thus, γ>0 must be a property of the optimum scheme. ￿
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